The relation between physical probabilities (rating) and risk-neutral probabilities (pricing) is derived in a large market with a quasi-factor structure. Factor sensitivities and default probabilities can be estimated for all kinds of credits on historical rating data. Since factor prices are obtainable from market data, the model allows the pricing of non-marketable credits and structured products thereof. The model explains various empirical observations: Credit spreads of equally rated borrowers differ, spreads are wider than implied by expected losses, and expected returns on CDOs must be greater than their rating matched, singleobligor securities due to the inherent systematic risk.
Introduction
How to value a loan or a mortgage? How to value structured credit products like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)? In response to the credit crisis in 2007/08 the need for accurate valuation has significantly intensified, see Deventer (2008) . The lack of active, well-functioning credit markets and the complexity of some structured products has made valuation an acute problem during the credit crisis. For the majority of borrowers, especially for private firms, homeowners, consumers, and small and medium sized enterprizes there is no secondary market. For large corporations, a benchmark for the price of credit risk is available in the form of corporate debt securities or credit default swaps (CDS), and large corporations often have credit risk assessments in the form of ratings from recognized rating agencies. For other counter-parties, there is no pricing information from the secondary market and for the assessment of the default risk banks have to rely solely on internal ratings.
Default probabilities (PDs) calculated from historical rating data are referred to as physical (or real-world) PDs, those backed out from bond or CDS prices are known as risk-neutral (or martingale) PDs. A key feature of credit markets is the large difference between default probabilities calculated from historical data and those implied from market prices. Altman (1989) was among the first researchers to comment on the discrepancy between the physical and risk-neutral measure. He showed that, even after taking account of the impact of defaults, an investor could expect significantly higher returns from investing in corporate bonds than from investing in risk-free bonds. Yawitz (1977) and Yawitz, Maloney, and Ederington (1985) establish a systematic relation between bond yield and the default probability under the assumption of a risk-neutral preference structure. While the risk-neutrality assumption reduces the complexity of these models, it causes a severe upward bias in the estimation of implied default probabilities. Silvers (1973) , Bierman and Hass (1975) , Wu (1991) , Wu and Yu (1996) provide models to separate the physical default probability from the certainty equivalent factor which reflects the degree of an investor's risk aversion. This paper presents an arbitrage-free principle to map physical default probabilities into risk-neutral default probabilities. Unlike earlier approaches, we do not intend to explain the returns of marketable corporate bonds ex-post but we want to provide an ex-ante valuation principle for non-marketable credits, credit derivatives like CDOs or the economic capital supporting a bank's loan portfolio. Our idea for a credit valuation principle is the following:
For large corporations both physical probabilities (from rating data) and risk-neutral probabilities (from market prices) are obtainable. For all other borrowers only physical measures are available (from internal or external rating histories). If the measure change from the physical to the risk-neutral world is known for the subset of large corporations, then the principle applicable to all borrowers can be inherited from this subset.
What links the large corporations with other kinds of borrowers is their common dependence on risk factors. As we will show empirically, there is non-diversifiable factor risk, and as we will show theoretically, factor risk must be priced (empirically, factor risk was priced from 10/2006 until 07/2007 as if the representative investor were risk-loving). Sensitivities towards risk factors can be estimated and validated for all types of borrowers on historical rating data. Since these factor sensitivities are not obtained from market return data but rating data, we obtain risk weights for any kind of credits, e.g. consumer credits, residential mortgages, or corporate loans to small and medium sized enterprises. The prices for factor risks is backed out from the corporate bond or CDS market. The combination of factor sensitivities, factor prices and default probabilities provides us with the pricing rule to value any kind of credit on a marked-to-market basis even for credits where risk neutral PDs are not directly available from the credit market.
In banking it is common to estimate the default probability over specified time horizons by means of statistical methods like multivariate discriminant analysis or logistic regression (see Hand and Henley (1997) or Baesens, Van Gestel, Viaene, Stepanova, Suykens, and Vanthienen (2003) for overviews of statistical default prediction models). Correlation between observations are incorporated by the inclusion of random effects. Binary default variables, multiple explanatory variables, and dependence through random effects can best be mod-eled by generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) (see e.g. Breslow and Clayton (1993) , McCulloch (1997) , or for an empirical application in credit risk McNeil and Wendin (2005) ).
Based on the GLMM framework we construct a large market with a quasi-factor structure.
Dependence between obligors is caused by both macro-factors and microstructural channels.
Without the additional microstructural effects we would end up with a pure factor model.
We then use an infinite arbitrage pricing theory argument, similar to the one used in Ross (1976) , Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) and Jarrow (1988) , to derive an arbitrage-free pricing principle. Whereas macro-factors are non-diversifiable and demand a risk premium, inducing a change from the physical to the risk-neutral measure, microstructural effects are diversifiable and do not. For multiple periods, our credit pricing model is extended to contain stochastic interest rates on the default free security.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 set out the assumptions and the details of the imposed economy. Section 3 derives the arbitrage pricing principle in this economy.
Section 4 extends the pricing principle to multiple time periods and incorporates a defaultfree interest rate process. Section 5 addresses the joint estimation of risk sensitivities and default probabilities for arbitrary time horizons. The estimation of factor prices from the CDS market is also addressed. Section 6 illustrates our pricing principle with two examples: digital default swap and CDO. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
The economy
This section presents the details of the economy. As in Lando (1998) , we make the assumption that the lender recovers a fixed fraction ω of the par value of the credit in the event of default. Thus, the credit can be split into a default-free tranche and a defaultable tranche with zero recovery. For the time being, the default-free tranche has zero interest rate and our focus is on deriving a one-period valuation formula for the second tranche -a pricing formula for a defaultable binary claim with no recovery.
Thus, we assume a single time period, starting at date 0 and terminating at time 1.
Uncertainty in this economy is induced by the probability space (Ω, F, P ). A credit in this economy, Y i , is modeled as a Bernoulli variable. In case of default the payoff is zero and one otherwise. We assume that Y 0 is free of default, and has rate of interest zero. Hence, Y 0 is defined as the constant that equals 1$ across all states and costs 1$ today. These assumptions will be relaxed in Section 4 in two stages. First, we will extend the model from one to T periods and second, we will introduce a time-discrete stochastic process for the return on Y 0 . Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) test the doubly stochastic assumption under which firm's defaults are correlated only as implied by a pure factor structure. They find some evidence of default clustering exceeding that implied by the pure factor model. Following this empirical finding, we assume the following quasi-factor structure, On the other hand, if we still find a function g(.) satisfying (2.1), and
then the random variable f k is not a factor. Egloff, Leippold, and Vanini (2007) present a credit portfolio model in which they distinguish between macroeconomic and microeconomic effects. Following their terminology our factors f are macroeconomic in nature (e.g. stock market return) and the remaining correlation represent microeconomic influences (e.g. legal and business interdependencies like supply chains).
We now turn to the pricing of the credit risk. The only risk that is relevant for the purpose of pricing is market risk or risk that cannot be diversified away. The key question then becomes whether microstructural risk is diversifiable or non-diversifiable risk. If, in fact, the additional microstructural risk can be diversified away, then there should be no additional risk premium charged. If it cannot, then it makes sense to think about estimating a separate risk premium.
To tackle the question of the credit risk premiums, we act on the assumption of riskaverse and non-satisfiable agents and we introduce the pricing functional p(.) which maps uncertain future cash flows into current cash flows (or current consumption units). According to Jarrow (1988) we define a finite-asset arbitrage opportunity to be a future cash flow X with P {X ≥ 0} > 0 whose price is less than or equal to zero: that is, p(X) ≤ 0. The selling of X would represent a probabilistic money pump. It has a positive or no cash flow at time 0, a non-negative cash flow at time 1, and a strictly positive cash flow at time 1 with positive probability.
Further, under the no-arbitrage condition, the pricing functional p(.) satisfies the property of linearity (or value additivity). That is, if α 1 Y 1 + α 2 Y 2 represents the credit portfolio of α 1 shares of Y 1 and α 2 shares of Y 2 , then
In other words, if p(.) were not linear then a basket of claims are not equally priced as the sum of their parts and therefore violating the no-arbitrage condition. These contradictions prove the following proposition. 
Given that we have an infinite portfolio of credits {Y
will be denoted as an infinity vector (α
, where exactly n of the elements are non-zero and where α n i represents the fraction of credit i in the portfolio. Although the sum involves an infinite number of terms, it is always well-defined since only a finite number of the terms are nonzero. By linearity, the time 0 value of this portfolio is
The reason for introducing this notation is that a limiting portfolio can now be defined without changing the summation indices (or rearranging terms) by just letting n → ∞.
Following Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) and Jarrow (1988) 
Suppose that Condition 2.1 does not hold. That is, suppose that the credit market allows investors to trade a portfolio that, approximately, costs one dollar and has a riskfree, nonpositive payoff. Then investors face no budget constraint. By selling this portfolio short they can generate arbitrarily large amount of cash for current consumption, while incurring no future obligations. In fact, if δ < 0, then investors could consume infinite amounts both now and in the future without risk. 
does not converge to zero. Then, there is an > 0 and a subsequence
converges to zero by continuity of the expectation operator, which contradicts Condition 2.1. This contradiction proves the proposition.
Arbitrage-free pricing principle
With our economy defined in the previous section we are now in a position to tackle the problem of pricing credit claims under the no-arbitrage constraint. The absence of arbitrage implies the existence of a pricing kernel (the Radon-Nikodym derivative) or, equivalently, the existence of a martingale measure Q in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1979) . 
Proof. We construct two sequences of variables,
where for all i is imposed so that in the limit as n → ∞ we will end up with a well-diversified portfolio. Now, by variance decomposition,
The second line follows by the fact that
The first equality makes use of linearity, the second equality follows by continuity of p(.) on 
The second equality uses the dominated convergence theorem since Proposition 3.1 is an extension to the special case of a pure factor structure in Jarrow, Lando, and Yu (2005) by including microeconomic effects. Proposition 3.1 shows that the pricing of well-diversified portfolios of credits can be reduced to the pricing of σ(f )-measurable claims. It provides a sense in which diversification has completely eliminated the idiosyncratic and microeconomic risk part from credit pricing. In other words, macroeconomic risk is not diversifiable, but microeconomic risk and idiosyncratic risk are. For individual credit claims, however, this argument does not go far enough. In particular, the equality
can have a finite number of violations that still preserve the equality p(C
well-diversified credit portfolios. To obtain exact equivalence for each single credit, stronger assumptions were needed. However, we do not want to derive stronger assumptions here.
We assume validity of (3.1) since equivalence on a single obligor basis ensures equivalence on large credit portfolios like a bank's loan portfolio or the asset side of a CDO.
Until know we have just assumed the existence of macroeconomic factors, correlation effects through microeconomic channels, and the existence of the Radon-Nikodym derivative was shown. Now, we need to impose some distributional assumptions. We assume a heteroscedastic probit setup with random effects. The survival indicator of obligor i, Y i , is
for an obligor-specific but deterministic default barrier S i and stochastic credit index I i . The following quasi-factor structure is imposed for each obligor i,
The pricing kernel Z(f ) is a function of the standardized Gaussian variables f and is assumed to be given via the Esscher transform, Z(f ) :
, where λ is a [K × 1]-dimensional vector. The variable Z(f ) is strictly positive and has an expectation of 1. Hence, the variable Z(f ) is a Radon-Nikodym derivative and induces the measure change from P to Q.
By taking the natural logarithm, we obtain 
under the risk-neutral probability measure Q.
Proof. The moment-generating function under the risk-neutral measure Q of the vector (f , ) is given by
The first line is definitional, the second line is a consequence of orthogonality between f and , and remember, the moment-generating function of a multivariate Gaussian variable with parameters µ and Σ is exp µ t + 
and double survival probabilities
where Φ 2 (., ., r) denotes the standardized bivariate Gaussian distribution function with correlation coefficient r. Variances and covariances are unaffected by the measure change, the default barriers however are shifted. Therefore, the physical probabilities depend only on the default barriers. The risk-neutral survival probabilities however depend on default barriers, factor sensitivities and factor prices. The higher the factor prices and the higher the risk sensitivities the lower the risk-neutral survival probabilities, ceteris paribus.
It is now straightforward to explain why the ranking of obligors in terms of the physical measure and in terms of the risk-neutral measure deviate. With an increase in factor prices the ranking diverges, i.e. the credit spread of more sensitive obligors increases faster than obligors with lower sensitivities. A risky rated bond, that is high default risk under the physical measure, can have a lower spread than a less risky claim with significant factor exposure. With falling factor prices, λ → 0, the risk-neutral measure converges to the physical measure.
Model extensions
The one-period pricing principle derived in Section 3 is generalized. First, we consider the valuation in multiple periods. Second, we include a return process on the default-free claim paying out 1$ at maturity. Third, we combine both to achieve a multi-period credit pricing algorithm with stochastic default-free interest rates.
Multiple periods
For the multi-period setup we introduce the filtration {F t } T t=1 , where F t denotes the available information set at time t generated by default indicator functions, microeconomic or idiosyncratic innovations, and macroeconomic shocks, i.e.
t}) .
We aim at valuing claims at time 0 and therefore conditional on the σ-algebra F 0 . The credit claims to be valued are assumed to be in the non-default state at time 0. The survival indicator is given by
for each i ∈ {1, ..., n}. The default barrier S i,t is time-dependent but non-stochastic. The default state, Y i,t = 0, is absorbing, i.e. if at some time t obligor i enters the default state, then the indicator remains zero for all subsequent times. The F t -measurable credit index I i,t is separable into a macro-economic part and a microeconomic or idiosyncratic part,
The two multivariate variables f t and t = [ 1,t , ..., n,t ] are stochastically independent and are assumed to follow an autoregressive process of order one, i.e.
The scalar serial correlation coefficient ρ, whereas |ρ| < 1, accounts for credit migration risk, e.g. favorable (unfavorable) economic conditions and/or profitable (unprofitable) management decisions in one period lower (increase) the default risk in the following period due to autocorrelation in the processes {f t } T t=1 and { t } T t=1 . The default barriers S i,t and risk sensitivities β i can be statistically calibrated (see next Section). The barriers S i,t are calibrated such that the following equalities with respect to forward probabilities are fulfilled for given σ i , β i ,
By the imposed assumption of an absorbing default state, we obtain by Bayes' law,
Under the risk-neutral measure Q the multivariate distribution of the microeconomic and idiosyncratic shocks is the same as under P . The means of the macro-factors however are shifted by the F 0 -measurable vector of factor prices, [λ 0 , ..., λ T −1 ] , in analogy to Proposition
The pricing kernel becomes,
Therefore, Z t is F t -measurable. The conditional variable f t+1 |f t , ..., f 1 is Gaussian again, the mean and variance and therefore the probability density function are calculated via linear projection (see e.g. Hamilton (1994) , p. 100-102). An extension would be to make the factor prices λ t a F t -measurable stochastic process instead of only time-dependent. In the most general form, the zero bond B i (t, T ) of obligor i with maturity T at time t is
The first line applies the one-period valuation formula, the second equality is again an application of the one-period valuation principle, the third and fourth line exploit the law of iterated expectations. This derivation provides us with the multi-period valuation principle.
To obtain an analytic formula for Equation (4.2) we impose the assumption that the macro-factors are serially uncorrelated, i.e. ρ = 0, and the factor prices non-stochastic. We obtain a serially uncorrelated price kernel process
, and an analytic formula for the defaultable bond price of borrower i at time 0 maturing at time T ,
Pricing formula (4.3) is designed so that it can be made consistent with the initial default term structure of borrower i through the time-dependent default barriers. Stochastic factor prices and/or autocorrelated factors would provide important theoretical insights, but in such general form has the disadvantage that it is computationally quite time consuming. Equation (4.3) is derived under stronger assumptions -no serially correlated factors and deterministic factor prices -but offers analytic tractability. Our pricing formula does not yet account for interest-rate risk which we tackle in the next subsection.
Default-free interest rate process
We have assumed until now that one claim is default-free and has rate of interest zero. In this section we relax this assumption by modeling the interest rate process of the default-free claim as a discrete extension of the short rate model as derived by Vasicek (1977) .
We extend the vector in Equation (3.2) by one component, 0 , representing the innovation process of the default-free interest rate. Under the physical measure P the default-free interest rate r t is F t -measurable, where r t denotes the continuously compounded interest rate from time t to t + 1, such that the one-period default-free zero bond at time 0 is a function of r 0 and therefore given by B 0 (0, 1) = exp(−r 0 ). The default-free interest rate process is specified as
where dependence between interest rate risk and default risk can be induced by the common factors f . As before, λ t denotes the time-dependent [K × 1]-vector of factor prices from time t to t + 1, c t is also time-dependent, and α is the mean reverting parameter, |α| < 1. 
Proof. According to Proposition 3.2, the means of the macro-factors are shifted under Q.
But the factors are still Gaussian distributed and uncorrelated. We therefore have,
If we define further θ t := β 0 λ t−1 + c t , then we get by iteration,
and by the properties of a geometric series,
The first term on the last line is a sum of independent Gaussian variables and therefore Gaussian as well. The sum of the T − 1 Gaussian variables has mean m T and variance s 2 T , as given in Equation (4.6), and Equation (4.7). The non-defaultable zero bond B 0 (0, T ) at time 0 with maturity T is therefore given by
which completes the proof.
Multi-period credit pricing with stochastic default-free interest rates
Given the process for the default-free interest rate in (4.4), we have all the ingredients to compute the zero bond of obligor i by evaluating the following integral,
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) assume stochastic independence between the default-free interest rate process and the default intensity process and find little effect on the empirical result. This finding implies that for pricing simple credits the independence assumption is adequate which greatly facilitates valuation. 
T are given in Equations (4.6) and (4.7).
Proof. The proposition is straightforward. First, we apply the stochastic independence between interest rate risk and default risk,
Then, we resort to Proposition 4.1, Bayes' law, and the serially uncorrelated price kernel process,
For the last equality see also our derivation in Equation (4.3).
For backing out the factor prices from marketable credits we can either resort to the yield spread (corporate bond market) or the credit default swap spread (CDS market). The yield spread y i (0, T ) at time 0 for a term of T between defaultable bond on obligor i and default-free bond is given as
Under the closed-form pricing formula in Proposition 4.2, the credit yield spread curve,
can be approximated by a Taylor's series 1 when the risk-neutral survival probability is reasonably close to one,
Viewed in this light, the credit yield spread on obligor i's claim is simply i's averaged riskneutral default probability over the time interval [0, T ]. Correspondingly, the credit default swap spread C i (0, T ) of obligor i at time 0 with maturity T and fixed recovery rate ω is approximated (neglecting counter-party risk) by C λ i (λ, 0, T ),
Econometric modeling
We introduce the statistical framework, we describe the data set, and we present the empirical results.
Generalized linear mixed model (GLMM)
A heteroscedastic probit model with random effects, a statistical framework that belongs to the GLMM family, affords the modeling of default correlation and heteroscedasticity. It provides us with the necessary parameter estimates from rating data for the above derived pricing principle -default barriers and risk sensitivities. As shown by Blöchlinger (2006) the GLMM framework is well suited to describe marginal and joint default probabilities under the physical measure. The vector of factor prices is obtainable from market data.
The inclusion of random effects is consistent with the doubly-stochastic models of credit defaults, under which, conditional on random effects, defaults are independent. For ease of exposition, we do not include microeconomic contagion effects, which could be calibrated separately in a second step (see Egloff, Leippold, and Vanini (2007) ). Thus, given a [K × 1]-dimensional vector f of random effects, the survival indicators Y i are conditionally independent Bernoulli variables with parameters
The random effects f have a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and with an identity covariance matrix, β i is a vector of sensitivities towards the random factors, the vector x i contains explanatory variables like financial ratios, the vector γ contains the corresponding regression coefficients, the weighted sum S i := x i γ is the default barrier of obligor i.
Proposition 4.2 provides us with an implicit estimation procedure for the vector of factor prices. Given the physical parameters S i,t , β i , and σ i , the default-free bond prices and observed market prices from defaultable bonds or credit default swaps 2 , the time-dependent
t=0 are determined by minimizing a statistical loss function (e.g. the mean squared error).
Data
The rating data consist of 11'430 S&P rated issuers across different countries and 10 industries. The rating data has been collected for twelve-month periods, ranging from Jan- Table 1 gives an overview of the data set. This data set could be further extended by including internal data sets like the credit card portfolio, the mortgage portfolio, or the portfolio of corporate loans.
With the extended data set one could estimate physical correlation measures, i.e. factor sensitivities, across the whole credit universe which can then be used for credit pricing.
For simplicity, rating notches have been suppressed. We merge CCC, CC, and C into one single rating class and the same is done to the rating classes AAA, AA, A. Thus, the explanatory variables, x i , consist of five rating class indicators. The factor sensitivities, β i , are estimated per industry cluster and therefore take on 10 different values. We assume constant volatilities, σ i = 1, for all observations i.
Industry
Obs.
R-Y Def. 
where n t are the number of CDS quotes at time t, C i (t, t + 5) is the 5-year CDS closing price of credit name i at time t, and C λ i (λ, t, t + 5) is the theoretical CDS spread as in Equation (4.9). The risk-sensitivities and default barriers were estimated from S&P's rating data for a one-factor setup. The factor price at time t is then estimated by minimizing the loss function in (5.2), where for a given day a constant instead of time-dependent λ, i.e. λ 1 = ... = λ 5 , and a recovery rate of ω = 0.4 as reported by Altman (2006) is assumed. Of interest is then the proportion of variation in the market data set that is accounted for by our model. In particular, we compute the determination coefficient R 2 i for obligor i,
where ln C i = 1 T T t=1 ln C i (t, t + 5) denotes the averaged log CDS spread of obligor i over time.
Empirical results
Obligors do not default independently of each other. The size of dependence can be obtained by looking at Table 2 for a one-factor model. The sector 'forest and building products, homebuilder, real estate' has the lowest sensitivity towards the common factor.
On the other hand, 'high Technology, computers, office equipment, telecommunications' has the highest factor risk exposure. The estimated factor sensitivities are significantly different from zero, i.e. zero is outside the two sigma confidence interval for all sectors.
These empirical results mean that there is a systematic factor in default risk that cannot be diversified away. Lenders should demand an extra return for bearing this risk. We also run the statistical procedure for multi-factor models. However, due to the scarcity of default events there are no further factors identifiable. With an average of less than 50 default events per year, it is understandably difficult to tell second factor effects from idiosyncratic noise or microeconomic effects. The estimated default barriers in the upper panel of Table 2 show decreasing default term structures for CCC ratings and below (B ratings and above) over the first four years, that is given survival of the current period the next period's PD is lower (higher) than the current period's PD. Figure 2 shows the model fit. In a first optimization we have calculated the market-implied factor price based on historical risk sensitivities as before (see Figure 1) . In a second step we have minimized -for the given factor price from the first step -the mean squared error by optimizing the risk sensitivity for each issuer (=market implied sensitivities). The majority of the CDS spread variation can be explained by our pricing algorithm, e.g. 97% of the variation in the BMW CDS spread is determined by our one-factor setup. ABB and Fiat have less impressive R-squares. This stems from the fact that the CDS market has long in advance anticipated S&P rating changes for the two companies (see Figure 1) . A more sophisticated point-in-time rating methodology would even achieve higher determination coefficients than the somehow simpler through-the-cycle approach followed by S&P.
Pricing examples
In this section we provide two illustrative pricing examples for credit derivatives: Digital default swap (DDS) and collateralized debt obligation (CDO).
Digital default swap (DDS)
A digital default swap makes a fixed payment of 1$ in case of default and 0$ else, and is therefore -unlike the more common credit default swap (CDS) -unaffected by the recovery rate. Formally, the payoff is the random variable 1 {S i <I i } . Under the assumption of a normalized credit index variance, σ 2 i + β i β i = 1, and according to Proposition (3.2), the arbitrage-free price of the digital default swap is
We provide absolute and relative pricing results in the Table 4 for seven different rating classes, AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and CCC, and various factor prices λ under a one-factor setup and under the physical one-year PDs as reported by Israel, Rosenthal, and Wei (2001) and Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997) .
A BBB-rated obligor with no systematic risk, β = 0, has a risk-neutral and physical default probability of 0.00637. On the other hand, an A-rated borrower with β = 0.3 has a Table 2 : GLMM estimation results. Point estimates and standard errors in parentheses for the regression coefficients and the factor risk sensitivities for ten different industries and one year spot/forward default probabilities. All parameter estimates are significantly different from zero at the 99% confidence level. Table 3 : CDS market data. Reported are the market-implied risk sensitivities β and the fraction of total variation that can be explained by the one-factor model, R 2 , for European credit names in various sectors and rating classes. . In brackets are the physical probabilities in percentage points of the risk-neutral probabilities. For investment rated borrowers and λ ≥ 1 less than 50% of the default risk premium is explained by physical default risk, the majority is the compensation for systematic risk taking. For CCC rated borrowers the fraction physical to risk-neutral is much higher.
risk-neutral default probability of 0.00877 with λ = 2 but only of 0.00147 with a factor price λ = 0 (as tabulated in Table 4 ). Depending on the current factor prices, a low risk rated bond with high factor sensitivities can have a higher credit spread than a higher risk rated bond with low factor sensitivities, ceteris paribus.
As seen from the relative comparison between physical and risk-neutral probabilities in Table 4 , the creditworthiness under the two measures can vary substantially. Unless λ = 0 or β = 0, only a fairly small fraction of the DDS price can be explained physically.
Betting on credit defaults, or equivalently insuring against defaults by buying protection (e.g. short position in corporate bonds or short position in CDSs), yields an expected loss.
You pay more today for default protection than you receive on average in the future. The loss stems from the insurance premium, βλ, against negative factor values. The higher the obligor's sensitivity β, and the higher the factor price λ, the higher the premium. For an A rated obligor with β = 0.3 and λ = 1 the expected loss for default protection is 0.00227 = −(0.00147 − 0.00374). The insurance/bet costs 37.4 bps and has a mean payout of 14.7 bps which yields a mean return of −60%. If the factor prices increase then the default risk premium will also increase. With λ = 2 the same default insurance costs significantly more, 87.7 bps as seen in Table 4 , but has the same expected payoff of 14.7 bps which yields now a return of −83% on average. At first look the premium may seem extraordinary high.
The default risk premium can be interpreted in a CAPM framework, see Treynor (1961) , Sharpe (1964 ), Lintner (1965 , Mossin (1966) , as the discount for a payoff negatively correlated with the market portfolio. Financial claims that fail to deliver their promised cash flows in the worst economic circumstances will have low prices, because these are exactly the states where a marginal dollar is most beneficial. Since bankruptcies tend to occur when the market portfolio incurs heavy losses (e.g. in a credit crisis), an insurance against default demands a high premium. On the other hand, obligors are rather non-defaulting in good market environments. Therefore, the opposite bets, i.e. selling default protection, results in gains on average. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) , Driessen (2003) , Hull, Predescu, and White (2005) , report that credit spreads include an important risk premium in addition to the compensation for the physical loss. In our setup this finding is theoretically substantiated in a factor model. With very low factor prices, the physical loss accounts for a larger part of the credit spreads, with high factor prices however, only a very small fraction of the spread is explained. Over time, we will experience time-periods when this fraction is high and others where it is rather low.
Credit officers and rating agencies estimate the physical probability of a credit event.
Financial engineers create credit derivatives on these events and they price these products in a risk-neutral sense. With our framework it is easy to see that the difference in expected returns can be positive (positive factor exposure)or negative (negative factor exposure). If investors price a structured product solely on the basis of its physical risk but not on the basis of its factor risk, then financial engineers seeking to exploit this pricing error, will have an incentive to create credit derivatives with low physical but high risk-neutral default probabilities. A CDO is an example of such a structured credit product with higher risk sensitivity than a single-obligor mortgage or a corporate bond (depicted in Figure 3 ).
The next section shows why collateralized debt obligations (CDO) have significantly greater factor exposure than simple loans or straight bonds.
Collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
A CDO allows its originator to issue a prioritized capital structure of derivative claims against the underlying asset pool. In a typical CDO, the underlying pool is either comprised of a portfolio of corporate bonds (cash CDO), loans (CLO), mortgages (CMO) or credit default swaps (synthetic CDO). The liability side of a CDO is sliced into tranches. The tranches differ in the default risk they are bearing -from the highest risk, the equity tranche, over the medium risk, the mezzanine tranche, to the least default risky part, the senior tranche. From a modeling perspective, the economic capital (debt capital) of a banks's loan portfolio is equivalent to the equity tranche (debt tranche) of a CDO.
We consider two stylized CDOs in a one-period and one-factor setup. The first CDO is assumed to consist of 1'000 (100 in case of the second CDO) digital default swaps (DDS) to gain exposure to a synthetic credit portfolio. We have four homogeneous groups of DDSs.
The groups' physical default probabilities are 0.1%, 0.3%, 0.9%, and 2.7% and each DDS has a face value of 1$, a risk sensitivity of β i = 0.35, and a standardized variance, i.e. σ The liability side of the two CDOs are divided into three tranches based on the level of default risk assumed. The CDOs are subdivided so that the senior tranche has a physical hitting probability of less than or equal to 10 basis points (bps) and the mezzanine tranche of less than or equal to 30 basis points (bps). We choose the thickness of the tranches so that hitting probability and target probability (10 bps and 30 bps) come closest. Following this algorithm, the equity tranche covers the first 69 defaults (8 defaults in case of the second CDO), the mezzanine tranche covers the next 19 defaults (2), the senior tranche finally covers the rest, a maximum of 912 defaults or 91.2% of the total (90 or 90%). In the CDO jargon, the mezzanine tranche of the more granular (less granular) CDO has the attachment point at 70 defaults (9) and the detachment point at 88 (10) defaults. Figure 4 illustrates the physical and risk-neutral loss distributions for the CDO with 1'000 credit names. The higher the factor price (=the stronger the risk aversion), the higher the expected loss and the heavier the tail of the loss distribution under the risk-neutral measure. Table 5 (Table 6 ) reports the corresponding risk-return measures for the CDO with an underlying asset pool of 1'000 DDSs (100 DDSs) obtained by 5 millions Monte Carlo draws. By comparing CDOs with single-name credit claims (see Figure 3) , we observe that CDOs have significantly higher factor risk exposures than their rating matched, singlename counterparts, and therefore command higher risk premiums. Consequently, stochastic factor prices induce far higher volatilities in CDOs than single-obligor securities. In the risk-neutral measure the ranking of CDOs and single-name credits can be reversed. For instance, the physical hitting probability of the debt tranches is less than 10 basis points. However, if λ = 2, a single-name DDS with a physical PD of 10 basis points and β = 0.35 has a corresponding risk-neutral PD of 82.6 basis points. The risk-neutral hitting probabilities of the debt tranches, however, are far higher with 10.5% and 7.8% even though all the DDSs in the collateral pool have also a sensitivity of 0.35.
A CDO tends to be hit when systematic shocks occur. A single-name credit, however, may default due to idiosyncratic reasons like management failure. A single default in the collateral pool does not trigger the default of the mezzanine or debt tranche of a CDO structure. The more diversified the underlying asset pool (e.g. the number of assets), the higher the resulting factor exposure. Changes in factor prices have a stronger effect in CDOs than simple loans/bonds. Hence, with the same amount of default risk (=physical default probability), CDOs must offer higher returns than corporate bonds.
The same is true for banks: the more granular the bank's loan portfolio (number of loans), and the more diversified the bank's assets (from a geographical as well as sectoral perspective) the greater the systematic risk for the bank's liabilities. Therefore, banks as well as highly granular CDOs default only under severe economic conditions and demand a far higher return on their debt, mezzanine and equity securities than equally rated non-financial corporations.
Conclusion
This paper presents an arbitrage-free pricing model of defaultable claims in large markets and in discrete time. Defaults are contagious and modeled as dependent random indicators triggered by common shocks. We distinguish between macroeconomic shocks (e.g. stock market crash), microeconomic shocks (e.g. through business dependencies), and idiosyncratic shocks (e.g. managerial failures). We show that microeconomic and idiosyncratic shocks can factor prices λ of a portfolio consisting of 1'000 credit names (digital default swaps). The distributions are simulated with 5'000'000 Monte Carlo draws. The more risk averse the representative investor, i.e. the higher the factor price λ, the more probability weighted are high losses (the more heavy-tailed the loss distribution). Table 5 : Granular CDO pricing: Valuation of debt, mezzanine and equity tranche in a one-period, one-factor setup with 1'000 digital default swaps as collateral: We report the risk-neutral hitting probability, mean payoff, price and mean return for various factor prices λ from zero (=physical probabilities, risk-neutral preference structure) to three (=strong risk aversion). The underlying 1'000 digital default swaps have all a factor sensitivity of β = 0.35,
, 1$ exposure and are uniformly distributed into four default probability classes, 0.1%, 0.3%, 0.9%, and 2.7%. Table 6 : Non-granular CDO pricing: Valuation of debt, mezzanine and equity tranche in a one-period, one-factor setup with 100 digital default swaps as collateral: We report the risk-neutral hitting probability, mean payoff, price and mean return for various factor prices λ from zero (=physical probabilities, risk-neutral preference structure) to 3 (=strong risk aversion). The underlying 100 digital default swaps have all a factor sensitivity of β = 0.35,
, 1$ exposure and are uniformly distributed into four default probability classes, 0.1%, 0.3%, 0.9%, and 2.7%.
be diversified away and demand no risk premium beyond expected losses. Macroeconomic shocks are non-diversifiable and represent systematic risk which must be rewarded by a premium. The risk exposure (=factor sensitivities) and the default probabilities (=default barriers) can be estimated for all kind of credits on historical rating data. The systematic risk premiums (=factor prices) are obtainable from marketable claims.
Given the two input parameters risk sensitivity and default barrier, together with the market risk premium, allows the valuation of non-marketable credits or thinly traded debt securities. We obtain a direct link between the rating of a debt security and its pricing.
Consequently, the information rating agencies provide is incomplete for pricing. We need additionally a separate assessment about the systematic risk, i.e. factor risk sensitivities. We then derive analytic valuation formulas for straight bonds. Valuation for structured credit products like CDOs or the economic capital of a loan portfolio is achieved by Monte Carlo simulations. Since credit spreads do not only depend on the physical default probabilities but also on risk sensitivities and factor prices, credit spreads are more volatile than can be explained from fluctuations of default probabilities alone. The model can be used for transfer pricing and consequently provides a solution to a concern raised by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) that banks do not properly price loans and therefore do not receive adequate compensation for the risks incurred.
Our statistical analysis of the GLMM framework applied on S&P's rating data supports one significant risk factor. The single factor causes systematic risk, i.e. default risk cannot be completely diversified. Some sectors have lower, others higher risk sensitivities, but all sectors are significantly correlated. The price for factor risk -obtained from the CDS market Illustrative examples are given for the valuation of credit derivatives: Digital default swaps and collateralized debt obligations. We show that the higher the security's risk sensitivity the higher the risk premium and the more volatile the yield. CDOs are multi-name debt securities and demand a higher risk premium than single-name digital default swaps, credit default swaps or corporate bonds for the same amount of default risk (=same physical probability of default). CDOs diversify away idiosyncratic and microeconomic risk. We show that the magnitude of the CDO's systematic risk grows with the number of assets included in the underlying portfolio. As the number of credits becomes greater and the portfolio becomes more granular, the tranches bear more factor risk. In any infinitely granular credit portfolio only factor risk is left, microeconomic and idiosyncratic risk is diversified away.
